This report presents one approach for modeling smallpox and inhalation anthrax outbreaks using ODEs (ordinary differential equations). This approach is related to a standard SEIR (susceptible exposed infected recovered) model. For each model, we define the states that characterize the uninfected and infected populations, the parameters governing disease progression, and the ODEs that govern the transitions between the population states. In both models, medical capacity and treatment limitations are considered. To quantify the benefit of an early public health response, the number of cases and deaths resulting from an outbreak are determined as a function of delay in public health response. The smallpox model indicates that early initiation of a mass vaccination campaign can significantly reduce the number of deaths. The anthrax model indicates that distribution of antibiotics at a high rate within the first day following a large attack can save nearly all those exposed. Future work will focus on replacing the ODEs with probability distribution functions based on data from outbreaks; doing so will lead to a more accurate model of the incubation periods and, in turn, a more accurate estimate of the benefit of an early response.
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INTRODUCTION
This report presents one approach for modeling smallpox and inhalation anthrax outbreaks using ODEs (ordinary differential equations). This approach is related to a standard SEIR (susceptible exposed infected recovered) model; see [2] , for example. One benefit of such a simple framework is greater transparency and fewer model parameters that must be estimated and varied. Other types of models include more complicated ODE formulations [35] and stochastic formulations with homogeneous mixing [20] and heterogeneous mixing [6, 11] ; homogeneous mixing assumes all people in the susceptible population are equally likely to become infected. See [8, 24] for a general review of these approaches.
The two ODE models are based on a framework of states described in section 2. For each model, we define subcategories of the primary states, the disease progression parameters, and the transition rates between the states. In both models, medical capacity and treatment limitations are considered. Smallpox is modeled as a single-stage illness with capacities defined for quarantine. Inhalation anthrax is modeled as a three-stage illness to which different medical treatments and capacities are applied.
DISEASE MODEL FRAMEWORK
The populations of both models can be separated into the six primary states shown in Table 1 . For each model, these states are further broken down into additional states.
TABLE 1
Basic states of the disease models, which are functions of time
Disease States Notation
Unexposed at time t
U(t) Exposed people at time t E(t) Symptomatic people at time t S(t) Vaccinated people at time t V(t) Recovered people or people with immunity at time t R(t) Dead at time t D(t)
Transitions between these states are governed by ODEs. Let P(t) C 7R" be a vector of the number of people in each state at time t, so that Pk(t) is the number of people in the kth state of the model at time t. Given the initial conditions P(to) and the differential equations, we can use Euler's method to estimate the number of people in each state at time t,. Euler's method is a typical method for solving differential equations, using derivative information from the previous time step t,-,i to estimate the number of people in the kth state at time trL:
Pk(t,,) = Pk(t-l) + P/(t?-l)At,
where P/.(t,_ 1 ) is the derivative of the kth population at time t,- 1 . For convenience, we define
iEI jEJ where f,k(t) is the rate of people moving from the ith into the kth state at time t, I is the set of states that flow into the kth state, and J is the set of states into which the kth state flows (To J = 0). When the ith state does not flow into the jth state, fi,j(t) = 0 for all t. For notational convenience when defining the rates fjj(t), we replace the notation fij(t) with f(ij) and i and j with the notation for the states shown in Table 2 .
Given the initial conditions, movement between the states will continue until everyone is either vaccinated, recovered (or immune) or dead. The initial conditions of the model are specified by the initial number of people infected, E(to), and the initial number of people who are susceptible, U(t 0 ). The total number of people in the simulation is
SMALLPOX MODEL
In the smallpox model, the six primary states, shown in Table 1 , are subcategorized according to whether people are quarantined or isolated (q), unsuccessfully vaccinated (v), designated as having a traceable meeting with an infectious person (c), receiving treatment (t), or will die (d). In all, there are twenty-one states, as shown in Table 2.   TABLE 2 States of the smallpox model
Disease State
Notation: Categorized Disease States
PARAMETERS OF THE SMALLPOX MODEL
The parameters of the model can be grouped into four categories: (1) disease progression, (2) prophylaxis effiacy, (3) public health response, and (4) resource limits. These paramneters are presented in Tables 3-6.   Table 3 lists disease progression parameters for smallpox up to and including the infectious period. Smallpox has a relatively long incubation period followed by a non-infectious prodromal period, marked by high fever and flu-like symptoms, that is in turn followed by the infectious period, marked by the characteristic smallpox rash. Because the prodrome is assumed to be noninfectious, it is included in the incubation period. The final step to recovery is progression through a non-infectious scabbing period, which is not modeled. Thus, R(t) is the number of individuals who have survived infection with immunity but who may not be fully physically recovered yet.
Currently, there is no treatment to improve the likelihood of survival once the rash has developed. However, we have included variables related to treatment (At, Pt, and 6t) in the model so that the model may be applied to an infectious disease that does have effective treatments or to model the outcome of a smallpox outbreak if an acceptable antiviral drug becomes available.
In the absence of any medical interventions, whether or not an outbreak becomes an epidemic depends on the value of the basic reproductive number, RO; R 0 is defined as the expected average number of secondary infections resulting from a single infectious person in a fully susceptible pop- 
The definition of /3 ensures that at the outset of the outbreak each infectious person infects on average R 0 people. This is a standard way to define the contact rate; for a similar definition see [10] in which contact rate is defined as /3 = Roi(ffNts 1 ) where 3.s1 is the amount of time an individual is infectious [10] . Table 4 lists the assumed efficacy of the smallpox vaccine. The prophylaxis efficacy for those already infected is an approximation based on the fact that the vaccine should be effective at preventing or reducing the severity of the illness if administered early during the incubation period, which may last between 9 to 14 days [25] . The window of opportunity for effective vaccination is estinated to be up to 4 days after infection [14] _ Recently, there has been much debate about the proper response to a smallpox outbreak. See [6, 11, 18, 20, 35] for examples of mathematical models currently being used to compare control policies for a smallpox outbreak. In this paper, we consider three basic responses: (1) contact tracing and ring vaccination, the final strategy used during the smallpox global eradication camPaign [7, 21] ; (2) mass vaccination, like that used during the last mass vaccination campaign in the US [34] (which also included contact tracing [33] ); and (3) these two responses in combination. In addition, the model can also simulate isolation of infectious people, which would also be another method of controlling an outbreak.
In the event of a smallpox outbreak, the current plan based on CDC guidelines is to use an "enhanced version of the surveillance-containment strategy that was successfully employed by the World Health Organization (WHO) to eradicate smallpox worldwide in the sixties and seventies" [28] and to resort to mass vaccination only if the surveillance-containment strategy does not appear to be effective. In the case of mass vaccination, the plan is to vaccinate 100,000 people/day per million people in the area [28] . As of July 2003, the Massachusetts Emergency Management Association plan is to vaccinate the entire state of Massachusetts (6.4 million) within 6 days, vaccinating 80% of the population in the first 3 days and the remaining 20% in the next 3 days [23] .
One interesting point of reference is the last mass vaccination campaign that occurred in the U.S. in 1947, which began after a man with undiagnosed hemorrhagic smallpox infected twelve others [7] . In this case, 6.35 million people in New York City were vaccinated between April 4 and May 2 [34] (although there is some debate as to the total number vaccinated [33] ).
Yet another unknown is the fraction of infected people who would be able to be traced by the public health system. When modeling the Kosovo outbreak of 1972 that occurred in rural Yugoslavia, Gani and Leach assumed that 97.5% of infected population was traceable [10] . Given our modern, mobile world population, this percentage may be much lower.
INFECTION AND CONTACT TRACING
In this section, we present the equations that govern movement between unexposed and exposed states via "meetings" between susceptible and infectious people as well as environmental exposures (-y -0). In addition, we also identify whether the meetings are traceable (0. $; 0) or not.
Some equations deal only with identifying those individuals who have had a traceable meeting and will be subsequently contacted and either vaccinated or quarantined.
In the model, contact tracing is only applied to those who have not yet become symptomatic. namely people in states Uc, Ucv, Ec and Ecv. These states contain people that have had traceable meetings (as designated by the letter c in their state names) and will be contacted if and when contact tracing is initiated. Until such time, people in Ec and Ecv will simply progress to a symptomatic state as if they were in E or Ev. Similarly, people in Uc and Ucu will be just as susceptible to infection as people in U and Uv.
Below are the equations governing movement out of states U. Uv, Uc, Ucv, E and Ev. A schematic of these transitions is shown in Figure 1 . For convenience, let the number of people who can infect others (that is, the number of infectious people not isolated) be
and let the number of unexposed people susceptible to environmental exposure be
The first four equations below represent traceable meetings with infectious people while the last, two equations represent untraceable meetings.
f (U, Uc) = 0c(1 -00 iU
te that when this model is implemented, care must be taken when U becomes small; this issue can be addressed by adding a small positive number to U, one on the order of floating point precision.)
Equations (13) and (14) below, which are similar to equations (11) and (12), represent infections that result from a meeting between an infectious person and an unexposed person who has had a prior meeting with an infectious person that was traceable. (Of course, this prior, traceable ireeting did not result in infection as they are still in Uc and Ucv.)
Uc
Uc
The equations below are similar to equations (7) and (8) but represent traceable meetings between infectious and already infected people.
f(E, Ec) = O0,0IE (15) f(Ev, Ecv) = O4,IEv (16) The equations below represent infections while in quarantine due to environmental exposure.
Uq
Uq
U AtĨ f 7 -0, then no one will become infected while in quarantine.
Expressions involving the min(., .) function, which represent environmental exposures, also appear in equations (11)- (14), but not in the equations governing movement into Uc, Ucv, Ec and Ecru because movement into these states implies that the source of infection was traceable. In the current model, we assume that environmental exposures are not traceable. As a side note. environmental exposures may be traceable if a large number of people can be traced back to a single place where the exposure occurred. However, this is currently unlikely in a time frame on the order of a week or so. A recent example of identifying a common source of exposure is the cluster of SARS cases at the Amoy Gardens Estate, where approximately 300 people were infected [30] . In this case, transmission appears to have been the result of both close contact and a leaking sewer system. It was contact tracing and subsequent analysis that led to the identification of a possible environmental source. Finally, the min(., .) expression does not always yield an ODE. For example, when (Uq/At) < -y(Uq/U), the number of people leaving Uq and entering Eq is f(Uq, Eq)At = (Uq/At)At = Uq, which is not a differential equation.
SMALLPOX DISEASE PROGRESSION
The following equations govern movement from exposed states to symptomatic states:
These equations distinguish between the fraction of those infected people that will recover. (1 -A), and of those that will die, A.
The following equations govern movement from symptomatic to the immune and dead states:
As mentioned earlier, the infectious period is followed by a non-infectious recovery period, which is currently not modeled. The parameters p and 3 determine the amount of time individuals are in S and Sd and allowed to spread disease. Thus, R(t) is the number of individuals who have survived infection with immunity but who have not likely fully recovered yet. See Appendix A for equations that can be used to model the non-infectious recovery period.
OUTBREAK CONTROL POLICIES
Whether or not someone is vaccinated or quarantined during a particular time step (that, is. f(i, j) # 0, where j is a state holding either vaccinated or quarantined people) depends on whether or not there is room in quarantine or vaccine available. See Appendix B for the scheme used to impose the resource limits defined in Table 6 .
Quarantine and vaccination of non-symptomatics
In this section, we present the equations governing quarantine and vaccination of those not yet symptomatic. Since the vaccine efficacy window is estimated to be only about the first four days after exposure, we do not model the vaccination of those already symptomatic.
Whether people are vaccinated or quarantined depends on whether or not contact tracing has been initiated and whether quarantine capacity or vaccination supply limits have been reached. Quarantining individuals with no symptoms can only occur if they have been designated as traceable contacts (O0 7 0). We consider three possibilities: (1) both vaccination and quarantine, (2) only vaccination and (3) only quarantine.
Let V be the populations in the model that may request and receive vaccination; that is,
If both vaccination and quarantine can occur, then the following transition rates are used:
A schematic of these transitions is shown in Figure 2 . In this case, when people move to quarantine, they are also vaccinated if they have not been vaccinated already. Equations (42) 
Figure 3. A schematic of the transitions allowed when contact tracing is followed by quarantine. The color coding of the arrows and circles is the somne as that in Figure 2;-pink arrows indicate transitions due to contact tracing and quarantining -if there is capacity.
If only vaccination can occur, then equations (52)-(43) and the equations below are usedi.
In this case, equations (42), (43) and the two above model vaccinationi as a result, of cont~act. tracinig. (In the experiments to follow, we assume that quarantine space is unlimited.)
If only quarantining can occur, then equations (52)-(55), (46), (47) and the equations below are used.
A schematic of these transitions is shown in Figure 3 .
In all cases, people move out of the quarantine after an average of F-1 days:
where u-I should be greater than a-', the incubation period, so that those who are infected and in quarantine will not be released back into the general population but rather will become sick while in quarantine and thus be held there.
Isolation and treatment of symptomatics
Other rates (or f(i, j)) may be nonzero due to isolation and treatment of symptomatic people. Once the epidemic control policies are initiated, we assume that symptomatic people will be isolated with an average delay of 0 1 days between symptom onset and isolation. If there is no treatment available and symptomatic people can only be isolated, then the following rates are used:
If we are modeling an infectious disease for which there is treatment and unfilled capacity, then the following rates are used:
where \ = At/A is the ineffectiveness of the treatment. Currently, if only supportive care is given to smallpox patients, then we assume that At = A; that is, mortality remains constant despite treatment. However, antiviral drugs are being developed [12, 19] . Also, we assume that the mean transition time to enter treatment while in isolation is 1 day (implied by the lack of the factor 0, in some of the equations above).
MODEL RESULTS

Model validation: comparison to Kosovo 1972
To validate our model, we compare the output of the model (number of cases) to data from the Kosovo outbreak of 1972 [7, 21] , for which the global eradication strategy was implemented.
We used the parameters given in Tables 3-5, except those shown in Table 7 , and we place no limits on the amount of vaccine available (daily or total) or quarantine space. The initial conditions are E 0 = 1, N, = 2.2 million people [7] . In addition, we set Mt = 0, that is, no simulation of treatment during the symptomatic infections period. On March 16 vaccinations in Kosovo began, two days after smallpox was suspected in 4 patients [71, 45 days after the index case is estimated to have become infected (f,= 45.5 days). By the end of April, after about 45 days, nearly 95% of the population of Kosovo (Nt = 2.2 million) was vaccinated, implying an average vaccination rate of (Nt,/45) people/day [7] . This rate corresponds to a rate of (1 -Ch)(Nt/45) non-immune people/day, given the initial placement of c,Nt people in V to simulate 'herd' immunity (V 0 = (hNt and U 0 = (I -Eh)Nt -Eo).
As shown in Figure 4 , there is good agreement between the recorded number of symptomatic individuals and the number predicted by the model for R 0 = 10. If we increase R 0 to 10.2, we get a better fit to the number of symptomatic cases between 50 and 70 days; however, doing so leads to an overestimation of the cumulative number of cases, Although the model does not capture the typical waves of cases or generations of illness, we see that the ODEs do capture the average transition time. For example, we see that the index case becomes sick after approximately 15 days.
As shown by the data, the incubation period of smallpox appears to follow a unimnodal distribution rather than an exponential one, which necessarily underlies the ODE that governs this transition. This is one reason to move to a slightly more complicated model that can use ,,eineral probability distribution functions (not just exponential ones) to define the transitions between the states. 
Hypothetical contemporary outbreak
To simulate a contemporary outbreak, we used the parameters given in Tables 3-5 except those  shown in Table 8 . We consider an initial release of smallpox that infects 100 people (Eo = 100) out of a total population of Nt = 3 million people, which is approximately the number of people in the Boston metropolitan area, and we place no limits on the amount of vaccine available (daily or total) or quarantine space. (See Appendix C for the combinations of the parameters required to model the public health responses.)
If the U.S. health care system responds as the one in Kosovo did, that is, during the second generation of secondary cases, then the model estimates that there will be roughly 106,600 cases and over 31,800 deaths, as shown by the red curves in Figures 5 and 6 . The second generation of cases would be expected to surface around day 45 because of the assumed average incubation period of 14.6 days. (The first cases will appear around day 15, the first generation of secondary cases around day 30, and the second generation of secondary cases around day 45.) If the public health system is able to diagnose and respond after the first few cases, but before the first generation of cases, then the number of cases and deaths will be bounded by the green and the blue curves. On the other hand, if we were able to detect and then initiate a response once the first case appears, then the model estimates there will be about 890 cases and roughly 270 deaths. Figure 7 shows that the number of people in quarantine peaks soon after the control policies (a few more than the incubation period) after the policies are implemented, as shown in Figure 8 . As shown, if a response is initiated very shortly after the first case appears, then there is not much difference between the four policies considered, but a mass vaccination campaign would likely result in more vaccine-related deaths (which is currenlty not modeled). The number of vaccine-related deaths is expected to be 1 to 2 per million people vaccinated [22] . However, rapidly identifying and tracing the initial cases infected during an attack, who are not yet symptomatic or just becoming symptomatic, might be difficult without biosensors. As delay increases, mass vaccination and the combined policy are equally effective at controlling the epidemic.
The cumulative number of people infected during the contemporary srmallpox outbreak, ,(t) = S(t) + Sd(t) + Sq(t) + Sqd(t) + R(t) + D(t).
Finally, it should be noted that the contact tracing rate will likely be limited: this is not simulated in the model. In addition, random effects at the beginning of an epidemic are not modeled by this deterministic model [8] nor are social networks, which may facilitate contact tracing. 
outbreak, Q(t) Eq(t) + Uq(t) + Eqv(t) +a Uqv(t).
A MODEL FOR INHALATION ANTHRAX
Inhalation anthrax is a noncontagious disease that we have modeled using three stages (a prodronral period, a brief "recovery" period, and then fulminant illness) to which different medical treatments and capacities may be applied. This model is different from the contagious disease model in that (1) there are no quarantine or contact states and (2) there are multiple stages of the disease. In addition, for smallpox, individuals are protected from infection by vaccination; for anthrax, individuals would likely be given a 60-day supply of prophylactic antibiotics, such as ciprofloxacin [15] .
In this model, the six primary population states are categorized according to whether a person is unsuccessfully given prophylaxis (v), receiving treatment (t), will recover (r), or will die (d). Table 9 lists the nineteen states. Figure 10 shows a complete state diagram for this model, which is reflected by the transition rates defined in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
TABLE 9
States of the inhalation anthrax model
Disease States
Notation: Categorized Disease States Unexposed
U(t) Uv(t) Exposed E(t) Ev(t) Symptomatic stage 1 Slr'(t) Sl(t) Slv'r(t) Slv2(t) Sltr(t) Sit2(t) Symptomatic stage 2 S2(t) S2tr(t) S2t3(t) Symptomatic stage 3 S3(t)
Individuals with inhalation anthrax initially experience nonspecific flu-like symptoms for a period of days and then sudden fever, labored breathing, and shock over a time period as short as a few hours, followed by death. However, it has been noted that there often appears to be a brief period of recovery before the final stage [17] . In this model, stage I represents the initial nonspecific flu-like stage; stage 2, the brief recovery period between the prodromal and fulminant stages; and stage 3, the fulninant and final stage.
When creating the model, we assumed that prodromal patients will receive the same prophylaxis as that given to patients with no symptoms. Thus, unexposed, exposed and prodromal people draw off the prophylaxis supply. To prevent so-called double counting or someone receiving prophylaxis before and after they become symptomatic, we define states Sly and Slvr. If individuals have received prophylaxis when they are latent (infected but not symnptomatic), but it was not successful (that is, they are in Ev), they are prevented from receiving additional prophylaxis by moving them into Sly and Slvr rather than S1 and Sir. See Appendix D for an alternate version of the model in which the prodronal treatment is independent of prophylaxis supply and rate of dlistribu tion. Currently, the model does not consider the dependence of the incubation period and other parameters on the dose of anthrax received. The model could be updated to include a umnber of "levels" of illness corresponding to various levels of dose received, thus requiring additional idisease parameters, but at the moment there is relatively little data from animal studies to support such a model.
PARAMETERS OF THE INHALATION ANTHRAX MODEL
The parameters can be grouped into four categories: (1) disease progression, (2) prophylaxis efficacy (3) public health response, and (4) resource limits, as shown in Tables 10-12. Mostb of the disease progression parameters, shown in Table 10 , were defined based on data from the most recent inhalation anthrax cases in 2001.
We. chose an average incubation time of 4.5 days [17] . The incubation periods that could be estimated from the most recent cases are shown in Figure 11 . It is possible that longer incubation periods would have been observed in 2001 if antibiotic prophylaxis had not been distribued to the at-risk population [3, 4] . Much longer incubation periods were observed during the 1979 Sverdlovsk outbreak [13, 26] as shown in Figure 11 . The average incubation period of this outbreak was 12.2 days, which is longer than estimates of 1 to 6 days for "high-dose exposures" [31] . Potential explanations for the longer incubation times are delayed germination of spores [13, 26] , low dose exposure [31] , and reaerosolization of spores. According to the 2001 data, patients took approximately 3.5 days on average to go to their doctor after becoming sick [17] . Thus, we estimated the initial stage to last about 3.5 days, which is in keeping with the CDC fact sheet, which states 1 to 5 days [5] .
To define the remaining disease progression parameters for untreated individuals, we used the data for the two patients who were sent home without receiving antibiotics and who later returned to the emergency room with fulmninant illness, dying after 1 and 3 days after their initial visits. For these patients, an average of 5.5 days passed between onset and death. Thus, we estimate the average length of the last 2 stages to be 2 days. Since stage 3 is relatively short, we define the duration of stage 2 to be 1.5 days and the duration of stage 3 to be 0.5 days. We define untreated recovery time to be 25.1 = 21 [26] + 4.1 [17] days for stage 1. For stages 2 and 3, we increased this recovery time by 1 and 2 days, respectively. We assume that unsuccessfiul treatment does not shorten nor lengthen the duration of the symptomatic disease stages. Table 11 shows the assumed prophylaxis efficacy. We assume an efficacy of 90% when prophylaxis is started during the incubation period. Significant protection against death was achieved with prophylactic antibiotics for Rhesus monkeys before discontinuation of the antibiotics 30 days post-exposure [9] . However, it is not likely that there will be 100% compliance in the completion of a 60-day course of antibiotics [35] . Among the 2,000 postal workers that were advised to take prophylactic antibiotics for 60 days, it is estimated that only about 40% of them completed the full course of antibiotics [16] .
The response parameters considered in this model are shown in Table 12 . These parameters include response delay, prophylaxis distribution rate, and average time delay to enter treatment. In addition, capacity limits can be imposed on the treatment states. These limits are shown in Table 13 .
TABLE 11
Inhalation anthrax prophylaxis efficacy
Parameter
Notation Value prophylaxis efficacy when uninfected q, 0.90 [9, 35] prophylaxis efficacy when infected Ce 0.90 [9, 35] 3 
INHALATION ANTHRAX DISEASE PROGRESSION
If all infections occur within a short time period, for example, a few hours, then it is reasonable to define the number of exposed people by the initial condition, E(to) = E 0 , rather than modeling their movement from unexposed to exposed, as we did for smallpox. Since we are considering an aerosol release of anthrax, this is the approach we took.
We begin by defining the transition rates from exposed to symptomatic:
Once symptomatic, without treatment, the disease progresses according to these equations:
With treatment, the disease either progresses or results in recovery according to these equations:
MEDICAL INTERVENTIONS
In this section, we define the transition rates related to prophylaxis distribution and treatment. These rates are non-zero as long as the resource limits have not been reached. Let V' be the states in the model that may request and receive prophylaxis; that is, V/ = U + E + S1 +-Sl-r.
(78)
If the prophylaxis supply (daily or total) has not been reached, then the following equations rates model successful and unsuccessful administration of prophylaxis to those unexposed, latent and prodromal.
V At
Equations (86) and (87) define the rate at which those in stage 2 and 3 enter treatment that. will ultimately lead to recovery.
Equations (88) and (89) define the rate at which those in stage 2 and 3 enter treatment that will not stop the disease progression.
RESULTS FOR A LARGE-SCALE AEROSOL ANTHRAX ATTACK
The model was used to investigate the effect of delaying prophylaxis and treatment. Of course, the effect of delay can be heightened or lessened by decreasing or increasing the average incubation time, respectively. We chose an average incubation time of 4.5 days, based on the most recent cases [17] . However, as mentioned, the Sverdlovsk outbreak did have a longer average incubation time [13, 26] .
For the large-scale attack, an initial number of exposed people was determined using an HPAC (Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability 1 ) simulation of a brief line release of anthrax from a boat travelling in Boston Harbor, assuming wind from the south east. In the simulation, 1 kg of anthrax was released in 16 minutes. The simulation reported that approximately 510,000 people within the greater Boston area would be exposed (that is, receive a dose greater than or equal to LCt2, a dose lethal for greater than 2% of those exposed) with an average mortality of 61%. Thus, we assume that 510,000 people are infected (E 0 = 510, 000) and that A = 0.61. Next, we must define the number of people who will not become sick but will demand prophyla~xis, U0. If we define this number to be small, say 50,000, this corresponds to accurately identifying those exposed and preferentially treating them, that is, having very accurate knowledge of the shape of the plume as a function of time and those people in the plume area at that time. However, if there is no way to determine this information, then with so many people becoming sick, it is likely that the entire metropolitan population will seek prophylaxis, and the total number of '•http: //www.dtra.mil/Toolbox/Directorates/td/programs/acec/hipac.cfm people in the simulation who will demand prophylaxis should be reflective of the number of people in the metropolitan area (Nt = 3,000,000, Uo = Nt -Eo).
For this scenario, we use the parameters shown in Tables 10-12, except for those shown in  Table 14 . We define the capacity limit for those in stage 2 (M 1 2 ) to be a percentage of the number of hospital beds in Massachusetts, which is estimated to be 16,600 [32]; we assume that 50% of these beds can be made available to patients needing advanced care. The capacity limit for stage 3 (Mt,) is estimated by the number of ventilators (portable and stationary) in the push packs delivered to New York City on September 11th [1] ; we assume that existing ventillators in the city will already be in use. It should be noted that the capacity for stage 2 and stage 3 treatments are not drivers of the attack outcome because the efficacy of these treatments are so low. Figures 12 and 13 show the total number of deaths and symptomatic people as a function of delay in public health response, which is primarily distribution of prophylaxis. Each pair of colored curves corresponds to a different distribution rate (v). Figure 12 shows that as treatment is delayed, the number of symptomatic people approaches the number of those exposed, while Figure  13 shows that as delay increases the number of deaths approaches 311,300 people (or AEO).
In addition, from these figures we can see that the number of cases and deaths is also dependent on the prophylaxis demand. During the incubation period, those exposed and unexposed will be indistinguishable from each other, so that if many uninfected people demand prophylaxis, then those who are infected will not receive prophylaxis in the most timely fashion possible. Overall, the sooner medical interventions are provided and the higher the distribution rate, the greater the reduction in deaths.
Assuming a higher prophylaxis efficacy, for example, 95% due to higher compliance or more effective prophylaxis, does not have much of an effect on the number of cases and deaths if prophylaxis must be distributed to the metropolitan population. Figures 14 and 15 show the predicted numbers of cases and deaths assuming 95% efficacy. There is a greater difference between the 95% and 90% prophylaxis efficacy when plume mapping can be used to target prophylaxis distribution (dashed curves). 
CONCLUSIONS
The disease progression models can shed light on critical windows of opportunity for public health interventions by quantifying the benefit of early response and high treatment rates. In particular, if antibiotic prophylaxis is distributed at a high rate within the first day following a large anthrax attack, nearly all those exposed can be saved if plume localization is successful. The results indicate plume localization is most beneficial when response is initiated within 2 days post-attack.
Similarly, the smallpox model indicates that early initiation of a mass vaccination campaign and quarantine can significantly reduce the number of deaths. However, the current smallpox model may underestimate the effectiveness of contact tracing for certain outbreaks since it does not model social networks. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine a threshold number of index cases that would overwhelm the contact tracing strategy [28] , in which case mass vaccination would likely be the best containment strategy.
FUTURE WORK
To more accurately quantify the benefit of early prophylaxis, the differential equation-based model should be updated to a more general transition-based model. The exponential distribution underlies the transitions of the ODE-based model and, as a result, leads to premature transitions between states, in particular the transition from exposed to symptomatic. For example, there were no cases of anthrax 2 days prior to the estimated release date in Sverdlovsk [26] . Thus the ODE model underestimates the benefit of early intervention since treatment is less effective once the individual becomes symptomatic. An updated model will have the option to use probability distribution functions defined by data from outbreaks whenever possible, such as the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak [26] .
APPENDIX A MODELING THE NON-INFECTIOUS RECOVERY PERIOD
Given the current assumption that all symptomatic people will be isolated within 01. days, we could use the following equations to estimate the number of physically recovered individuals,
In this case, nearly all those who become sick move into R(t) from Sq(t) and Sqt(t) with average delays of p-I + pr-and p-I + p_ 1 days, respectively. With no capacity limits imposed on isolation, only a fraction of symptomatic people would move to R(t) with a delay of p-1 days, which would essentially represent a shortened recovery time. However, if the isolation is not assumed, then additional states and equations would be warranted. In particular, a state to hold non-infectious recovering people who are never isolated would be required.
In the case of limited isolation capacity for symptomatic people, one approach to model the number of fully recovered individuals requires one additional state and two additional parameters (a state to hold those individuals who are still recovering but not infectious and two parameters equal to the non-infectious recovery period with and without treatment). We only need one additional state for two reasons. First, we can assume that those in isolation do not spread disease (given the current definition of J), so the average transition time between Sq and R can be increased to the infectious period plus the non-infectious recovery period, and similarly for Sqt to R, without increasing disease spread. Second, in the case of a fatal illness, there is no symptomatic yet noninfectious period. In this case, the equations would be
where Sn is the number of recovery people who are no longer infectious, p, is the non-infectious recovery period, and Pnt is the non-infectious recovery period with treatment, which would hopefully be the shorter of the two periods.
APPENDIX B
IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOURCE LIMITS
The ODEs presented in the earlier sections were solved using Euler's method with a time step At = 0.1 day prior to the initiation of an epidemic control policy. After the initiation of this policy, the time step is allowed to vary so that the capacities for quarantine and treatment are not exceeded. To do so. we define Ati = rain(At, AtM., AtMq, AtMt, AtI,,ot AtM!otl), (B-i)
where
where AV, AQ and AT are the number of new people who would be vaccinated, moved into quarantine and treated (determined by evaluating all of the relevant differential equations and assuming a time step of At = 0.1); Pdailg is a running total of all prophylaxis distributed during the current day; QdaiIl, and Tdaily are running totals of people in quarantine and treatment respectively; and Vttal is the number of units of prophylaxis given out so far. Note care must be taken, when the denominator becomes close to zero; this can be addressed by adding a tiny numnber to the denominator.
At the start of a new 24-hour period, Vda~iy is reset to zero. However, Qdcily and Tdaly are treated differently; people must recover from these states for room to become available. 
APPENDIX C RESPONSE PARAMETER VALUES
In the next two paragraphs, we describe the parameter values required to initiate the public health responses we are considering (using the Matlab model): (1) contact tracing followed by quarantine and vaccination, (2) mass vaccination, and (3) both of these responses in combination. To simulate contact tracing followed by quarantine and vaccination of contacts but no mass vaccination, set Oc G (0, 1] equal to the proportion of contacts expected to be found, set Mqtota 1 > Mq > 0, anrd set AlItotcl > M, > 0. To turn off mass vaccination, set v = 0. If v = 0 and -A1ltotal > M, > O0 then only those contacted will be vaccinated; note, v or the mass vaccination rate applies only to U arid E.
To simulate mass vaccination (of people in U and E) only, define the vaccination rate (r > 0) and set Mvtotai > M~, > 0. (If Mtotal 0 = M, = 0, no one will receive prophylaxis even if v > 0.) In addition, set 0, = 0 (so that people in U are not moved to Uc, a state to which mass vaccination does not apply and similarly for E and Ec). If 0, = 0, then Uc(t) = 0 and Ec(t) = 0 for all t (and thus, Ucv(t) -0 and Ecv(t) = 0 for all t); this ensures that all those unexposed and not vaccinated will remain in U and will receive prophylaxis according to V and similarly for those in E.
APPENDIX D ALTERNATE ANTHRAX MODEL
In section 4, we introduced an inhalation anthrax model that assumes that the treatment for prodromal patients is the same unit of prophylaxis distributed during the mass prophylaxis campaign. In this model, people enter the prodromal treatment states (Sltr and S1t2) at a rate of v,. We could assume a different treatment scheme for prodromal patients, either the number of people allowed to enter the state can be rate-limited using a different rate, or the number of people allowed to enter can be based on a capacity limit in terms of people. In the first case, the capacity is lefined by the number of people treated per day and should be reset daily. In the second case. space in the state becomes available as people recover.
The alternate model described in this section assumes that prophylaxis and the prodromal treatment are different, so states Slvr and S$v2 are not needed to ensure that people will not receive prophylaxis twice. In addition, f/ = U + E. Figure D-1 shows a schematic of this model. As a result, v is replaced by Mt, and we must redefine the equations governing movement into the treatment states Sltr and Slt2, as shown below. Movement into Sltr and Slt2 should now be dictated by the capacity limit Allt, and capacity will not be exceeded by appropriately defining Ati as 
